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 Water - Kenya 
This report has been made by the African Studies Centre in Leiden for VIA Water, 
Programme on water innovation in Africa, initiated by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. It is accompanied by an ASC web dossier about recent publications on water in 
Kenya (see www.viawater.nl), compiled by Germa Seuren of the ASC Library under the 
responsibility of Jos Damen. The Kenya report is the result of joint work by Marcel Rutten, 
Ton Dietz, Dick Foeken and Fenneken Veldkamp. Blue texts indicate the impact of the 
factual (e.g. demographic, economic or agricultural) situation on the water sector in the 
country. The authors used (among other sources) the ASC web dossier on water in Kenya 
and the Africa Yearbook 2013 chapter about Kenya, written by Nic Cheeseman (see 
reference list). Also the Country Portal on Kenya, organized by the ASC Library, has been  
a rich source of  information (see http://countryportal.ascleiden.nl).1 
©Leiden: African Studies Centre; September 2014 
Political geography of water 
The Republic of Kenya is part of the East African Community. The capital and 
largest city is Nairobi. The name is derived from a small stream (Enkare Nairobi: 
‘the stream which is cold’) found in the area occupied by the Maasai pastoralists 
before the arrival of the British colonizers. Kenya lies on the equator with the 
Indian Ocean to the south-east, Tanzania to the south, Uganda to the west, South 
Sudan to the north-west, Ethiopia to the north and Somalia to the north-east. 
Kenya has a population of more than 45 million. The country is named after 
Mount Kenya, the second highest mountain in Africa; at the border with Tanza-
nia the other African giant mountain can be found, Mount Kilimanjaro, and 
Mount Elgon is located on the border between Kenya and Uganda.  
 
Figure 1 Map of Kenya 
 
Source: http://countryportal.ascleiden.nl/kenya 
                                                 
1 The report has been realized on the basis of short-term desk research and makes no claim of being  
definitive, complete or scientifically substantiated. 
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Kenya’s hydro-geographical situation is quite complicated. There are five major 
‘water towers’ in Kenya, namely: Mt Kenya, Aberdare Range, Mau Complex, the 
Cherangani Hills and Mt. Elgon as depicted in Figure 2 below. These water tow-
ers give rise to five drainage basins which are critical to the country’s socio-
economic wellbeing. The major drainage basins are those of Tana River and 
Lake Victoria. The Tana River system gets most of its water from the northern 
Aberdares and the Mount Kenya area, and – after feeding a hydro-electric plant 
after a major dam – flows through the semi-arid and arid drylands of the East, 
feeding the irrigated areas of Hola and Bura and the smaller irrigated zones near 
the Coast (Tana Delta). North of Tana we find the Ewaso Ngiro River system 
connecting the Northeast of Kenya (and Kenya’s Somali ethnic group) with So-
malia. South of the Tana we find the Athi-Galana River system, connecting the 
southern part of the Aberdares/Nyahururu Ridge and its rich coffee and tea areas 
near Thika Town, rapidly expanding Nairobi and Athi River Town, and the rela-
tively dry Machakos and Kitui maize and sorghum areas as well as the huge Tsa-
vo national parks, with the Coastal areas and emptying in the Indian Ocean near 
Malindi, and its famous coral reef zone (Marine protected area). The southern 
Coastal towns of Mombasa, Kenya’s major port city, and Kilifi Town are con-
nected to smaller river basins. In the North Coastal cities Lamu (on an island) 
and Kipini (at the mouth of Tana River) are of growing geopolitical importance, 
as they are near Somalia, but also because they are the focus areas of a major de-
velopment plan: building a big harbour to connect South Sudan and Northern 
Kenya’s oil-rich areas with the Kenya Coast and from there to global customers, 
bypassing Sudan’s harbours on the Red Sea (for details see section on Economy).  
Kenya has nine lakes with a total surface area of 10,747 km². Most of the lakes 
are saline with the exception of Lakes Victoria, Naivasha and Baringo. In the 
North, Lake Turkana gets its water partly from the Omo River system in Ethio-
pia, where irrigation and hydropower activities and plans threaten water security 
of Lake Turkana (and of the people depending on fisheries there). Another part 
of Lake Turkana’s water comes from the Mount Elgon area and the Suam-
Turkwell River system (where a huge hydro-dam was built in the 1980s in the 
area between Pokot and Turkana ethnic groups, the Turkwell Gorge Dam). And a 
third part of the water comes from the Kerio water system, getting most of its 
water from the western Highlands (southeast of Eldoret Town), bordering the 
famous Rift Valley. In the Rift Valley there are important lakes: from Lake Tur-
kana in the North via Lake Bogoria, Lake Baringo, Lake Nakuru (near Nakuru 
Town), Lake Naivasha (near Naivasha Town) and Lake Magadi (the salt lake, 
near Tanzania). Most of these are important tourist destinations, and part of a 
tourist circuit that also includes Amboseli National Park in the south and the 
Maasai areas.   
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Figure 2 Main lakes and rivers Figure 3 Water towers in Kenya 
 
 
 
Source : Wikimedia Commons  Source: UNEP 
 
 
The western part of Kenya is part of the Nile system, via rivers like the Mara 
River that empties in Lake Victoria. In these areas there are a few small and me-
dium-scale irrigation areas (e.g. Ahero and the Kano Plains). A small part of 
Lake Victoria (and particularly the Winam Gulf near Kisumu City) belongs to 
Kenya. Most of the other parts of Lake Victoria belong to Tanzania and Uganda. 
Its borders form one of the most densely populated areas of Africa, and the Ken-
yan lands adjacent to Lake Victoria are part of Kenya’s poorest, and politically 
most marginalized areas, inhabited mostly by the Luo, Kisii and Luhya ethnic 
groups. Those groups lost most of the political battles after Kenya’s independ-
ence in 1963; Kenya was either dominated by a political and economic elite of 
Kikuyus (Presidents Jomo Kenyatta, Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta included) 
or by the political elite around Kenya’s second President, Daniel arap Moi, from 
the Kalenjin ethnic group living near Kenya’s Great Rift Valley.  
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Figure 4 Elevation Figure 5 Land Use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Population Figure 7 Ethnicity 
 
    
Source elevation: http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/maps/map/en/?iso3=KEN&mapID=603 
Source land use: http://www.jrank.org/history/pages/8365/Looking-At-KENYA.html  
Source population: http://www.catsg.org/cheetah/07_map-centre/7_3_Eastern-Africa/thematic-
maps/Kenya/human-population.jpg   
Source ethnicity: Kenyan embassy to the UN, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (retrieved from 
bbc.com) 
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Figure 8 Precipitation Figure 9 Temperature 
  
Source Precipitation map: http://www.bestcountryreports.com/Precipitation_Map_Kenya.php 
Source Temperature map: http://www.bestcountryreports.com/Temperature_Map_Kenya.php  
 
 
Most of Kenya is semi-arid or even arid. A small part of the country southwest of 
the Great Rift Valley towards Lake Victoria, and east of the middle range of 
Great Rift Valley towards and around Mount Kenya is both humid and endowed 
with very good soils. Here most of Kenya’s agricultural areas can be found: 
maize and wheat, but also coffee and tea. The recent growth in horticulture and 
flowers mostly come from semi-arid to sub-humid areas, with irrigation using 
lake, river and ground water (e.g. the flower industry near Lake Naivasha). Re-
cently vast artesian groundwater reservoirs have been discovered in the North-
west, in the Turkana area. Kenya’s semi-arid/sub-humid areas in part of the 
southeast (Machakos and Kitui) are relatively densely populated. Droughts have 
been a regular feature in most of dryland Kenya, but occasionally floods happen 
as well. And the Coastal zone is threatened by sea level rise and storm damage.  
Most of Kenya has a bi-modal rainfall pattern, with most rain falling in April-
May (both in Nairobi and Mombasa), and a second period around November-
December. Depending on where one is in Kenya, the driest periods are in Janu-
ary-February or in June-October. Nairobi borders the humid areas towards the 
West and the drylands of the East.  
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Figure 10 Rainfall and temperature in Nairobi  Figure 11 Rainfall and temperature in  
   Mombasa 
   
http://www.jrank.org/history/pages/8365/Looking-At-KENYA.html 
Demographic situation: population, urbanization,  
water consumption trends 
Kenya has about 45 million citizens (2014 estimate) and an average annual popu-
lation growth of 2.68% (2005-2010) which is much lower than in the past. One 
of the reasons for this drop is excess mortality due to AIDS (1.6 million people 
have AIDS, the 4th highest position in the world, according to the CIA World 
Fact Book).  
 
 
Figure 12 Population pyramid 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook 
 
 
Almost a quarter (24%) of the population lives in an urban environment. UN pro-
jections suggest that by 2025 this percentage will have risen to 30%. The major 
urban areas are Nairobi (3.4 million inhabitants) and Mombasa (972,000 inhabit-
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ants, 2011). Other fast growing towns are Kisumu, Nakuru, and Eldoret. It is also 
worth noting that some of the most populous areas are (or have been) the UN-
HCR-managed refugee camps [Dadaab and Kakuma] in the eastern and north-
western drylands of the country, as a result of refugee migration from Somalia 
and South Sudan/Uganda. Nairobi’s boundaries have recently been shifted out-
wards and the city is likely to link to smaller satellite cities such as Kitengela and 
Thika in the years to come. As Gitahi (2011) stresses this growth will likely raise 
conflicts with the rural hinterland as Nairobi and other cities get water from the 
rivers in these areas. 
According to the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Sup-
ply and Sanitation 2014, 82% of the urban population and 55% of the rural popu-
lation had access to improved drinking water sources (protected sources) in 2011; 
hence, 18% of the urban population and 45% of the rural population had access 
to unimproved drinking water sources (unprotected sources and surface water).2 
Almost 30% of the total population had access to improved sanitation facilities in 
2011, so 70% of the total population had access to unimproved sanitation facili-
ties. There is hardly any difference between the urban and the rural areas for 
sanitation facilities because a large part of the urban population lives in squalid 
conditions.  
Looking at a longer period of time - i.e. the 1990 to 2011 period - there was 
not only an increase in the number of people with access to improved water 
sources, but also an increase in the number of people with no access to improved 
water sources. This applies in particular to the urban areas: in urban Kenya, the 
number of people with access to improved drinking water doubled between 1990 
and 2011, but the number of people with no access to improved drinking water 
grew fourfold! This can be related to the high urbanization rate in Kenya: most 
people who migrate to town end up in one of the informal settlements, where 
drinking water facilities are often non-existent. Comparable figures apply to sani-
tation facilities, be it to a lesser degree (table 1). 
 
                                                 
2  These percentages may be rather optimistic: according to IMF (2014), 60% of the urban population 
and 40% of the rural population had access to improved drinking water sources.  
 
 
Table 1 
1990-2011 NATIONAL POPULATION URBAN POPULATION RURAL POPULATION 
Water 
% growth 
popu-
lation 
% growth 
access to im-
proved water 
source 
% growth NO 
access to im-
proved water 
source 
% growth 
popu-
lation 
% growth 
access to im-
proved water 
source 
% growth NO 
access to im-
proved water 
source 
% growth 
popu-
lation 
% growth 
access to im-
proved water 
source 
% growth NO 
access to im-
proved water 
source  
 91 237 41 152 198 35 59 255 53 
Ghana 69 174 -50 144 170 15 27 181 -60 
Kenya 78 152 21 151 126 432 63 166 12 
Mali 83 324 -11 178 367 -35 54 309 -9 
Mozambique 77 144 42 161 179 113 54 112 36 
Rwanda 54 71 26 485 414 1200 31 44 12 
South Sudan ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
           
Sub-Sah. Africa 70 119 24 125 128 112 49 117 12 
Northern Africa 41 49 -13 58 60 32 24 38 -32 
Africa 65 98 21 106 106 102 45 95 10 
1990-2011 NATIONAL POPULATION URBAN POPULATION RURAL POPULATION 
Sanitation % growth 
popu-
lation 
% growth 
access to im-
proved sanita-
tion facility 
% growth NO 
access to im-
proved sanita-
tion facility 
% growth 
popu-
lation 
% growth 
access to im-
proved sanita-
tion facility 
% growth NO 
access to im-
proved sanita-
tion facility 
% growth 
popu-
lation 
% growth 
access to im-
proved sanita-
tion facility 
% growth NO 
access to im-
proved sanita-
tion facility 
Benin 91 607 128 152 351 120 59 1162 142 
Ghana 69 266 56 144 286 124 27 238 20 
Kenya 78 106 68 151 199 134 63 96 52 
Mali 83 168 68 178 195 170 54 116 47 
Mozambique 77 273 57 161 206 137 54 594 43 
Rwanda 54 193 -12 485 457 534 31 167 -27 
South Sudan ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 
           
Sub-Sah. Africa 70 96 61 125 120 129 49 88 40 
Northern Africa 41 76 -50 58 61 18 24 93 -57 
Africa 65 88 52 106 93 123 45 90 32 
Source:  WHO/UNICEF (2013), Progress on sanitation and drinking-water: 2013 update, pp. 14-35  
              Geneva / New York: World Health Organization / United Nations Children's Fund.      
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Political situation and institutional setting  
Political situation  
Following the adoption of the 2010 constitution, Kenya embarked on a process of 
devolution of power. The new constitution formally constrained the overwhelm-
ing power of the presidency, and it decentralized power and a considerable 
amount of finance to 47 new counties. There was a widespread, though inflated, 
popular belief, especially in poorer regions feeling left out of historical govern-
ment largesse, that with devolution on hand, development was finally at hand 
(Holmquist 2014). However, the process of devolution is still marred with un-
clarities over budgets and responsibilities between the central and county council 
governments. The devolution process, which includes the creation of 47 counties 
and transfer of more than 30 percent of public expenditures from central to coun-
ty level, is the biggest reform that Kenya is facing (IMF 2014). Also at central 
level newly introduced institutions as the National Land Commission ran into 
problems with the Ministry of Lands over the division of tasks and responsibili-
ties.  
 
 
Figure 13 Counties of Kenya 
 
Source: http://www.guide2kenya.com/information/53/ 
Counties-of-Kenya 
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The general and presidential elections in March 2013 passed relatively peacefully 
(compared to election violence in 2007-2008) and saw Jubilee Coalition’s Uhuru 
Kenyatta declared President and William Ruto Deputy President. Relations with 
Western donors have become problematic due to the cases of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) against the President and Deputy President for their alleged 
roles in the 2007-2008 post-election violence. Kenya also made international 
headlines following the Westgate terrorist attack in September 2013, killing al-
most 70 people. The Somali Islamist group Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility 
saying the attack was a punishment for Kenya’s invasion of Somalia in 2011. 
The government has been criticized for its handling of the (aftermath of the) at-
tack, and the infringements on freedom of speech it has enhanced through the 
adoption of a new Media Bill. Protests have been aired by journalists and civil 
society groups.  
By contrast, Kenya received international acclaim as the first African country 
to launch an Open Data website. The website contains over 400 datasets, more 
than 200 of which are on Kenya’s newly created counties. Kenya watchers feel 
that the ICC crisis takes away time and attention needed to address the food and 
economic problems the country has to face like in the field of water develop-
ment.  
 
Institutional setting of water 
Over the past decades, the Kenyan Government has undertaken several water 
sector reforms in an attempt to increase water access (Sambu & Tarhule 2013). 
The first attempt to ‘reform’ the water sector came as early as 1974 when the first 
National Water Master Plan was launched (Kisima 2007). The primary aim of the 
Plan was to ensure availability of potable water, at a reasonable distance, to all 
households by the year 2000 – under the legal framework of Water Act Cap 372. 
In line with the Plan, the government upgraded the Department of Water Devel-
opment of the Ministry of Agriculture into a fully fledged Ministry of Water to 
coordinate actors involved in the provision of water and sanitation services 
(Mumma 2005; Kisima 2007; Gakuria 2008). The government attempted com-
mercialisation of services from the late 1980s, backed by donors such as Germa-
ny and the World Bank. A new Water Policy was launched in 1999, and a new 
Water Act in 2002. Since then, a major overhaul of the water sector (see Table 2) 
has been taking place, and much hope was placed in private-sector participation 
(Nilsson & Nyanchaga 2008). The Water Act 2002 provides for the establish-
ment of three levels of institutions for the provision of water supply and sewer-
age services: Water Services Regulatory Board, Water Services Boards, and Wa-
ter Service Providers. The management of water resources is under the Water 
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Resources Management Authority and Water Resources User Associations 
(Owuor & Foeken 2009).  
 
 
Table 2  Roles and responsibilities of institutions in the water sector reforms  
  
Ministry of Water and Irrigation Policy formulation, sector coordination, monitoring, 
financing and supervision. 
Water Resources Management Authority Regulation of water resources management 
Water Services Regulatory Board Regulation of water and sewerage services 
Catchment Areas Advisory Committees Advise the Water Resources Management Authority 
on issues concerning management of water resources 
at the catchment level 
Water Services Boards Responsible for the efficient and economical 
provision of water services within their area of 
jurisdiction through signing of service  
provision agreements with Water Service Providers 
Water Resources Users Associations Provides a forum for conflict resolution and 
cooperative management of water resources in 
designated catchment areas. 
Water Service Providers Direct provision of water and sewerage services as 
agents of Water Services Boards. 
Water Appeal Board* Handle disputes in the water sector. 
Water Services Trust Support financing of pro-poor water services in unserved 
areas. 
National Water Conservation and  
Pipeline Corporation 
Bulk water supply, dam construction, flood control, 
land drainage, ground water development and 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation reserve Water Service 
Provider 
Kenya Water Institute Training and research 
Source: adapted from MWI (2005) quoted in Owuor & Foeken (2009) 
* some changes are around the corner as with the Water Appeal Board that will be done away with. 
 
 
The overhaul of responsibilities took time to become clear to all parties involved. 
And many unclarities are still around as concluded by a World Bank policy brief 
in 2013, not in the least because of the recent devolution of power to the coun-
ties. ‘Water services in Kenya are at an important and exciting crossroad. Devo-
lution of the water services function has assigned responsibility for water provi-
sion to democratically elected county governments that now face the challenge of 
being responsive to the needs of their electorates and to honour the constitution-
al obligation to progressively provide water services to all people. The role of 
national government will change to policy development, sector oversight and 
support. An independent regulator can play an important role to monitor pro-
gress on the right of water and ensure funds are effectively spent. The track rec-
ord of water companies shows that they continue to make an important contribu-
tion in service delivery, and county governments would be well-advised to build 
on this momentum, rather than overhauling the system rapidly. 
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Understanding and addressing the challenges identified in this note can help 
smoothen the transition process, ensuring that services continue to be delivered 
and access extended while policy and institutional reforms are designed and im-
plemented.’  
Munyao (2011) highlighted legal issues, in particular the impact of the formal-
ization of water user groups of the Upper Ewaso Ng’iro river. It was found that 
large-scale users dominated these new water management institutions and as a 
result benefited most. Aarts & Rutten (2013) also noted a lack of financial re-
sources and implementing capacity. They also stress that training of WRUA 
members is too much restricted to a few officials and that most communities 
need a full-time professional manager to run the WRUA effectively. 
The World Bank advice to make use of water companies to assure service de-
livery is challenged by a large number of studies. Onjala (2002: 163, 292) de-
scribes the start of private water companies in Kenya in the mid-1990s. These 
companies were owned by the municipalities and the major reason for advocating 
privatization of municipal services appeared to be the lack of resources by urban 
governments. Privatization was primarily a way to help relieve the local authori-
ties of the financial burden in providing such services. 
The Water Service Boards (WSBs) were created to take full responsibility for 
the provision of water services through signing of Service Provision Agreements 
with Water Service Providers (WSPs). Sambu & Tarhule (2013) studied 44 
WSPs and concluded that performance was poor and none of them was able to 
meet the MDGs by 2015. 
As Nilsson & Nyanchaga (2008) suggest, the Water Service Providers for their 
part - being commercial entities - may not identify the urban poor as their prima-
ry customer group. As much as Kenya’s water sector reform may seem to have 
accomplished an historic turn-around in the sector, from the viewpoint of the ur-
ban poor, much is still the same. 
Changing informal institutions and behaviour is the real challenge. Reformers 
must acknowledge the long-term dynamics of urban water supply systems; there 
will always be resistance to change from actors with vested interests in the sys-
tem. Owuor & Foeken (2012b) studied the implementation of the Lake Victoria 
Water and Sanitation programme (LVWATSAN) in the secondary town of Homa 
Bay and confirmed the problem of vested interests especially at the expense of 
the low-income settlements. Although LVWATSAN led to various considerable 
improvements in terms of water supply at the level of the municipality, they also 
concluded that a lot remains to be achieved, especially in the low-income settle-
ments. The daily water production and supply of 3,000 m3 is still far below the 
estimated demand of about 18,000 m3 per day. The water supply situation be-
comes worse with the unpredictable water rationing that can take up to three 
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days in the two studied low-income areas. For a number of households, the 
‘normal’ daily water supply hours are short, irregular and unreliable. As such, 
residents in the two areas rely on other water sources – besides their main 
source (...) [including] water vendors, rain water, shallow wells, rivers and wa-
ter from the Lake [Victoria]. As a result of all these problems, water consump-
tion in the two areas appeared to have strong seasonal components: during the 
dry season, the piped water is more unreliable, insufficient and interrupted; 
households spend more time and long distances looking for water; they rely more 
on unsafe water; are forced to survive with the little water available; and pay 
more in purchasing and treating water. Furthermore, as women and the girl-
child shoulder the burden of fetching water, inadequate access to water has a 
major gender dimension in Homa Bay (Owuor & Foeken 2012b: 37-38). 
Finally, Nilsson & Nyanchaga (2008) state that it is necessary for institutions 
to create an incentive structure that is supportive of low-cost technology and pro-
vision in informal settlements, so that poor people can enjoy their entitlement to 
public services. In Nakuru, Ngugi (2012) came to a similar conclusion of the 
need for pro-poor water and sanitation incentive systems. Crow & Odaba (2010), 
describing the availability of water for women in a slum in Nairobi, mention the 
heavy expenditures of time and money needed, which confirms findings by 
Birongo & Le (2005) that poor households are forced to pay more for basic needs 
such as water than their neighbours in ‘well-to-do’ neighbourhoods. Local NGO 
Twaweza states that the poor in Nairobi’s informal settlements pay up to 30 
times more per unit of water compared with residents of more affluent neigh-
bourhoods (IRIN 8 November 2010). 
Birongo & Le (2005) zero in on troublesome Public-Private Partnerships and 
the role of corruption as a factor disrupting the governance system. Accusations 
of corruption at the highest level within the water sector were made by assistant 
minister Mwangi Kiunjuri when handing over documents to the Kenyan Anti-
Corruption Commission which he claimed showed widespread corruption in the 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation (IRIN 8 November, 2010). 
Carlberg (2012) points out for Kisumu that not the lack of (safe) water is a 
problem but the price for the urban poor. As a solution groundwater pumps have 
been installed in public spaces, which allows payments through mobile phones 
(see box 2 under section ‘Economic setting’). But according to Foeken et al. 
(2013: 7), Kisumu’s water provider KIWASCO (Kisumu Water and Sewerage 
Company) faces many more challenges: in 2008, the company produced about 
18,000 m3 of water per day, but the demand was estimated to be about 45,000 m3 
per day. The result has been a severe water shortage. Moreover, Kisumu has one 
of the highest levels of unaccounted-for water – i.e. water that is provided but not 
paid for – in Kenya. When KIWASCO started its operations, the unaccounted-for 
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water level was 75%. This was reduced to about 62% in 2008. This (still) high 
level can be attributed to, amongst others, non-functional (static) meters, illegal 
connections, as well as burst pipes and leakages. However, Owuor & Foeken 
(2012a) also mention a very successful local initiative in one of the low-income 
areas of Kisumu to improve the water and sanitation situation: the Wandiege 
Community Water Supply Project, which started as a self-help group in 2001 and 
became an officially registered water company in 2007 (beside ‘big brother’ 
KIWASCO).  
Economic setting: economic situation,  
transport system, innovation, ICT 
The overall national development objectives of the Government of Kenya are: 
accelerated economic growth; increasing productivity of all sectors; equitable 
distribution of national income; poverty alleviation through improved access to 
basic needs; enhanced agricultural production; industrialisation; accelerated em-
ployment creation and improved rural-urban balance. Despite political uncertain-
ty in 2013, severe terrorist attacks (Westgate attack) and uncertainty surrounding 
the prosecution of President Kenyatta and deputy President Ruto at the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Kenya’s economy has performed reasonably well in 2013 
and grew by 5.6%. Per capita GDP increased from $1,737 in 2012 to $1,800 in 
2013, and is expected to grow to over 6% in 2014. This expectation may, howev-
er, change since a number of terrorist attacks on the Kenyan coastal towns took 
place in June 2014, hurting the tourism sector and foreign investment. Most of 
the growth is due to expansion in agriculture (4.6%), industry (6.4%) and the 
services sector (3.6%). Remittances continued to play a critical role in 2013. Of-
ficial transfers climbed to $ 1.3 bn. Analysts believed that the investments of re-
mittances in the housing sector was one of the reasons behind the sky-rocketing 
price of property in Kenya (Africa Yearbook, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 14-16 
 
 
A tea plantation (wikipedia)  A flower farm (©Rutten) A Tourist Lodge (©Rutten) 
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Kenya’s main export products are tea, horticultural products (flowers), coffee, 
petroleum products, fish and cement. Main export partners in 2012 were Uganda, 
Tanzania, the Netherlands, UK, USA, Egypt and DRC. Imports came mainly 
from India and China (over 36% combined; up from only 16% in 2005). Kenya is 
increasingly looking east and the troubles the heads of state have with the ICC 
will likely increase this share in the years to come as especially Western coun-
tries are blamed for pushing the ICC case.  
The IMF stated in January 2014 that although Kenya’s economic growth had 
improved over the years, sustained and even more inclusive growth that creates 
jobs is essential to ensure that all Kenyans can benefit. Three areas merit particu-
lar emphasis. First, continued implementation of fiscal devolution. Second, more 
infrastructure investment and social programmes, and improved revenue mobili-
zation and transparency, especially in the management of natural resource 
wealth. Third, the process of regional integration needs to continue.  
The high national debt and corruption allegations are matters of economic 
concern to the IMF. Unemployment is high (40%), as is the population rate be-
low the poverty line: 43%. In 2008, Kenya developed a major development plan, 
Kenya Vision 2030, which should transform the country to a middle income so-
ciety over the next years. Kenyatta’s government has committed itself to contin-
ue this major challenge as developed by his predecessor Mwai Kibaki. One of the 
key aspects is a series of high-profile infrastructure projects notably the Lamu 
Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) (see Box 1). 
Kenya has four international airports (Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and Eldo-
ret). The arrival hall of Jomo Kenyatta International Airport burnt down in 2013. 
Rebuilding and extension of the airport is to be completed in the second half of 
2014. Mombasa is the main sea port. The port is also of importance for Uganda, 
Rwanda and other landlocked countries. For many years it has suffered from in-
sufficient cargo handling capacity and poor management. The development of 
the new port near Lamu is planned to assist oil exports from South Sudan and 
will also be linked to Ethiopia. Kisumu, bordering Lake Victoria, is the main in-
land port and has ferry connections to Uganda and Tanzania, 
The road network has undergone a major overhaul in recent years, especially 
through Chinese contractors. Still, poor roads, a so far inadequate railway net-
work, under-used water transport and expensive air transport have isolated most-
ly arid and semi-arid areas in the country, which is problematic for its farmers, 
including pastoralists and fishermen. 
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BOX 1: Infrastructure investments 
The Lamu Port – South Sudan – Ethiopia Transport and economic development (LAPSSET) 
corridor is a multi-billion dollar flagship project under the Kenya Vision 2030 National 
Development Policy blue print. The project comprises 7 major components – a port in Lamu, an 
oil pipeline from Juba, South Sudan to Lamu, Oil refineries in Lamu and Isiolo, a railway link 
to South Sudan and Ethiopia, three resort cities and airports at Lamu, Isiolo and Lokichogio and 
a High Grand Falls along the River Tana for Hydropower generation. The LAPSSET Corridor 
will link South Sudan and Ethiopia, both landlocked countries, with the Indian Ocean through 
Lamu.  
 
 Map of the Lamu project, showing the scope of  
 the project 
 
 Source: Wikipedia  
 
 
The construction of the port was launched on 2nd March, 2012 by the Presidents of Kenya and 
South Sudan and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. At the time of the mission, preparatory 
activities towards the official launch of the project had been undertaken. This included road 
construction and clearing of the port site among others. Fast start projects that had already been 
allocated funding include the drilling of 10 boreholes that will supply 1.2 million litres of water 
daily for Lamu residents and the proposed port and installation of a diesel power plant to 
generate one mega watt of power. China has also started connecting Lamu and Garsen districts 
to the national electricity grid. 
The LAPSSET project is part of The Great Equatorial Land Bridge that will cut across the 
middle of Africa by a high speed road and rail network, a fibre optic cable and an oil pipeline 
starting from Lamu at the Indian Ocean in Kenya through Juba in South Sudan, Bangui in 
Central Africa Republic and finally link with the Atlantic Ocean in Cameroon, through Yaoundé 
and Douala. Ethiopia will also be linked to the bridge via a similar road, rail and fibre optic 
corridor that will branch out from Isiolo, Kenya and run to Addis Ababa. A major port, oil 
refinery and airport will be constructed in Lamu, Kenya. Two other airports, an oil refinery and 
three resort cities will be developed in Kenya alone. This project is envisaged to be the largest 
infrastructure project ever undertaken in Africa. (Box continued on next page). 
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The area in and around Isiolo has historically witnessed numerous conflicts between the 
different pastoralist communities and with neighbouring agricultural communities over pasture 
and water, especially in the dry seasons when pastoralists migrate to the farming communities 
areas. But lately, the conflicts have escalated and intensified with the reasons shifting to 
territorial claims. This is attributed to the LASSPET corridor’s airport, tourist resort and 
communication hub to be developed in Isiolo. Likewise the Tana and Lamu regions witnessed 
several deadly encounters, partly linked to unclear land issues. Local action groups supported by 
international nature conservation organizations point at illegal land acquisitions by outsiders at 
the expense of the local population. Government officials and politicians party to the 
development plan had been able to obtain land around the port, resort city, and refinery plant 
sites with a view to speculative gain. In addition, an influx of outsiders was expected raising the 
population numbers in the area from some 100,000 to 1.25 m. Moreover, the port site and 
sailing route will cause massive destruction to both terrestrial and marine life, and will destroy 
Lamu, which is endowed with rich biodiversity, rich marine ecology, and coral reefs that are a 
major attraction to tourists, and which are fish breeding grounds (Noor 2014 in Pambazuka). 
 
 
Kenya has more than 30 million mobile phone subscribers. Mobile banking such 
as the Safaricom-launched M-Pesa service is already increasing financial access 
amongst low-income groups with emerging opportunities for innovative saving 
and payment applications in the water service sector (see Box 2). Mobile phones 
also provide opportunities to address systemic operational inefficiencies and to 
govern water resource use and allocation more effectively. In Kenya a number of 
these initiatives have been started in the last few years, mostly in an urban set-
ting. For water service utilities the Smart Water Systems (SWS) approach can 
break the downward spiral of poor operational and financial performance. By 
coupling mobile banking and smart water metering, SWS can create a secure, 
transparent and low-cost flow of funds and information between consumer, water 
service provider and delivery system. By driving down water payment transac-
tion costs, revenue collection will increase and administrative costs will be re-
duced, it is hoped (Hope et al. 2011). Initial attempts were mostly supported by 
donors and geared at having the technology right. The challenge will be to have 
customers interested to upload submissions voluntarily. Other challenges to 
smart water technologies include security threats to physical assets (water meters 
are often stolen), access to and cost of capital, network coverage, and cost of mo-
bile payment (Hope et al. 2011, Ross & Luu 2012).    
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BOX 2: ICT and water in Kenya 
Launched in March 2007, the M-Pesa innovation is perhaps the most successful service of its 
kind in the world. Using their mobile phones customers can send up to Ksh 140,000 per day 
(approximately € 1100) with a maximum of Ksh 70,000 per transaction. Low demands can be 
serviced with the permitted transactions of as little as Ksh 50. This accelerates cash movement, 
particularly among the low income people. M-Pesa customers can deposit and withdraw money 
from a network of agents that include airtime resellers and retail outlets acting as banking 
agents. It has become a ‘mobile wallet’, especially for the huge proportion of consumers 
without bank accounts.  
In relation to water it is known for example that using their mobile devices herders can now 
find out where to graze their cattle and directly pay for water and pasture. In sustained 
management of rural water supplies, there have been proposals to apply pre-paid services with 
the Solar Powered System proving most popular for its low running cost and secured revenue 
collection (Rutten & Mwangi 2012). M-Pesa could also be used to link potential customers and 
water vendors by providing water price data through SMS and the location where to get the best 
price (e.g. M-Maji in Nairobi). Mobile phones could also be used to pay for monthly water bills 
or make upfront payments to open up a community borehole for a maximum amount of water 
after having made the payment through mobile phone (e.g. see Carlberg 2012). 
 
Agricultural dynamics 
The African Studies Centre recently published a research report about Kenya’s 
agricultural performance, together with ODI (as part of the Developmental Re-
gimes in Africa project, funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs; see 
Dietz et al, 2014). One of the tables in that report highlights the long-term devel-
opment of Kenya’s food crop production, comparing 1961 and 2011. We repro-
duce that table here.  
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Table 3  Population and basic food production dynamics in Kenya, 1961-2011 
 2011/1961 
 1961 1970 1980 1990 2000 2011 index 
Population  
(millions) 8.4 11.3 16.3 23.4 31.3 41.6 498 
Cropping area (ha of harvested crops, x million)1 
Cereals 1.1 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.7 242 
Pulses 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.5 1.2 1.5 229 
Roots/tubers 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 231 
Yield (kg/ha x 1000) 
Cereals 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.5 122 
Pulses 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 122 
Roots/tubers 7.0 7.7 7.4 9.7 7.1 15.4 219 
Total basic food production (million tons) 
Cereals 1.4 2.1 2.2 2.8 2.6 4.1 295 
Pulses 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.8 280 
Roots/tubers 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.6 3.8 505 
Food energy value of crop mix (kcal/kg) [recalculated from FAOSTAT ]  
Cereals 3137 3136 3111 3101 3083 3124 100 
Pulses 3414 3401 3405 3418 3414 3410 100 
Roots/tubers 962 966 988 899 913 982 102 
Weighed to- 
tal [inferred] 2484 2547 2468 2458 2360 2202 89 
Food energy value (kcal/capita/year x 1000) 
Cereals 516 582 427 369 256 305 59 
Pulses 112 104 73 113 52 63 56 
Roots/tubers 87 83 72 62 48 90 103 
Total 716 770 572 544 356 458 64 
Food energy value (kcal/capita/day) 
Cereals 1414 1595 1168 1010 700 834 59 
Pulses 307 285 201 309 143 173 56 
Roots/tubers 239 227 198 171 131 248 103 
Total 1960 2107 1567 1489 974 1255 64 
Source: Population data as used by FAOSTAT are from the World Population Prospects: The 2010 
Revision from the UN Population Division; all production data: FAOSTAT crop production(final 2011 
data, updated: 08 August 2013, accessed on 19 September 2013 from 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/567/default.aspx#ancor); food energy values recalculated from FAOSTAT Food 
Balance Sheets. 
 
1 Roots and tubers are mainly potatoes, cassava and sweet potatoes in Kenya. Cereals are 
mostly maize, sorghum, wheat and millet as well as some rice. In 1961 sorghum and 
millet accounted for 20% of total cereal acreage; in 2011 it was only 14%; maize in-
creased from 68% to 80%. 
 
We also reproduce the table with an overview of all crop dynamics:  
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Table 4  Kenya’s crop groups: harvested area (x 1000 ha), 1961-2011 
 In bold food crop groups with area growth faster than population growth for the fifty-year 
period as a whole (which almost quintupled: 2011/1961 index=498). 
Crop 1961 2011 2011/1961 highest in 
   index  
Cereals 1106 2680 242 2011 
Pulses 645 1477 229 1995 
Roots/tubers 108 249 231 2009 
Plantains 1 3 250 2010 
Pyrethrum 30 8 27 1975 
Fibres 114 61 54 1985 
Oil crops 72 247 341 2007 
Fruits excl. plantains 54 195 363 2010 
Tree nuts 11 35 308 1977 
Vegetables 44 162 372 1999 
Spices 5 6 126 2005 
Coffee 42 160 384 1998 
Sugarcane 18 64 363 2010 
Tea 18 188 1058 2011 
Tobacco 0 23 5581 + 2010 
Total 2266 5556 245 2011 
Basic food/ 
Total 82.0% 79.3%   
Note: Fruits exclude melons; vegetables include melons 
Source: FAOSTAT crop production(final 2011 data, updated: 08 August 2013, accessed on 19 
September 2013 from http://faostat.fao.org/site/567/default.aspx#ancor). 
 
 
And we add the major conclusion of this report: “Kenya cannot afford its current 
low levels of food sufficiency. Over the past 50 years, the production of most 
basic food crops did not keep pace with population growth and the basic crops 
which did (potatoes, sweet potatoes, rice and beans) did so more through area 
increase than through yield increase (...). Kenya’s attempts to develop non-food 
crops were partly successful: its non-basic food area went up from 18% of its 
total crop area in 1961 to 21% in 2011 (...). Of course, Kenya’s tea production 
has been a textbook success story, as has the expansion of its various oil crops 
(seed cotton, oil palm, coconut). And the increases in production of sugarcane, 
fruits and vegetables (partly for the export market) can also be seen as major suc-
cesses. But these cannot compensate for the lack of basic food security and the 
last few years have been quite alarming for Kenya’s food-security situation. 
Kenya’s total agricultural land increased from 4% of its 569,140 km² to 10%, but 
most of the remaining land is arid or semi-arid and regarded as too risky for agri-
culture or reserved for wildlife parks”. 
As is obvious from the tables above, the agricultural sector in Kenya is fore-
most characterized by smallholder and rainfed production of maize. The produc-
tion of major food staples such as maize is subject to sharp weather-related fluc-
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tuations. Production downturns because of droughts periodically necessitate food 
aid. Tea, coffee, pyrethrum, maize, and wheat are mostly grown in the fertile 
highlands, one of the most successful agricultural production regions in Africa. 
Livestock predominates in the semi-arid savannah to the north and east, and in 
the southern Maasai areas. But the dairy, poultry, and pig industries have all ex-
panded rapidly as well, and can mainly be found in what Kenya calls ‘high-
potential areas’ (and near the big cities). Coconuts, pineapples, cashew nuts, cot-
ton, sugarcane, sisal, and corn are grown in the lower-lying areas. The agricultur-
al sector cannot guarantee food security yet. Still, agriculture is the second larg-
est contributor to Kenya's gross domestic product (GDP). Horticultural produce 
and tea are the main growth sectors and the two most valuable of all of Kenya’s 
exports. The Lake Naivasha floriculture industry accounts for more than 70% 
(US$400 million) of the country’s cut flower exports. Kenya’s cut flower exports 
account for more than 40% of the EU retail market while generating 9% of Ken-
ya’s total foreign exchange revenue and contributing 2-3% to the Kenyan GDP. 
In 2008, the Netherlands accounted for 51% of Kenya’s cut-flower exports fol-
lowed by the UK (25%) and Germany (9%) (Hemel, 2013). 
The other side of the coin is that a 2010 study conducted by the Water Re-
source Management Authority of Kenya found that the amount of illegal bore-
holes and abstraction points in the Naivasha area is almost double the amount of 
legal ones (WRMA 2010, Voorpijl 2011). Attempts have been put together to 
address these issues but according to Van Oel et al. (2014) there still is a mis-
match between required knowledge and efforts by scientists and stakeholders in 
the Lake Naivasha basin to manage water resources in an integrated way. 
Naivasha is complicated due to its variety of interests (horticulture, floriculture, 
tourism, fishing, tourism, geothermal power generation and so on). Furthermore, 
this Rift Valley Lake has a complex geology and hydrological build up which is 
not yet fully understood and makes it hard to predict the water level of the lake. 
According to Becht (2007), however, lake levels have remained significantly be-
low expectations since the introduction of flower growing.  
Ngigi et al. also report of adverse effects of irrigated agriculture in the upper 
Ewaso Ng’iro basin which starts from the highlands of Mount Kenya. Decreasing 
river flows are attributed to (illegal) over-abstraction, mainly for irrigating horti-
cultural crops and resulting in alarming conflicts among various water users 
(Ngigi et al, 2008). A call is made for flood storage to increase river flows during 
dry seasons.  
Mwangi (2007) stresses the negative role of the fast growing number of small-
holder irrigation schemes in the Mt Kenya region. Their performance is below 
the national average and more crop per drop does not seem to be on their minds. 
Poor scheme designs and weak institutions contributed to this underperformance.  
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Kabubo-Mariara et al. (2006) also stress that weak environmental manage-
ment practices hamper agricultural growth. This is confirmed by Nyangena 
(2009) who studied practices of soil and water conservation (SWC) in three re-
gions in Kenya and concluded that in most cases where it was practiced, SWC 
was beneficial to agricultural performance. Gitahi (2011) suggests the need to 
improve irrigation technologies and move from bucket to drip and low pressure 
sprinkler irrigation to raise outputs.  
There are three major types of irrigation schemes in Kenya: smallholder 
schemes; commercial/private schemes; and (public) schemes of the National Irri-
gation Board. The private sector controls most of the farms under irrigation. It is 
foremost using river water. Over the years the use of sprinklers has increased. 
Since 1985 the area under irrigation has doubled to stand at some 100,000 ha by 
2003 (FAO 2006). The growth over the years in the public sector, however, has 
been minimal. In fact, the long history of public irrigation development in Kenya 
is one foremost of failure. IFPRI (2010) concluded that the potential for irrigation 
investments in Africa is highly dependent upon geographic, hydrologic, agro-
nomic, and economic factors that need to be taken into account when assessing 
the long-term viability and sustainability of planned projects. The irrigation po-
tential of Kenya has been variously estimated at 350,000 to 540,000 ha and is 
mainly available in the Nile (Lake Victoria) basin and the East Coast (including 
Tana and Athi basins) (FAO 2006; Alila & Atieno 2006). Recently, attempts 
have been announced to revive the public schemes and increase the area under 
irrigation, especially at the coast.  
 
 
Table 5 FAO 2006 
Province Area equipped for irrigation 
 (ha) 
Central 49 200 
Coast 6 661 
Eastern 13 986 
Nairobi 2 000 
North Eastern 5 803 
Nyanza 8 575 
Rift Valley 16 415 
Western 563 
Kenya Total 103 203 
With groundwater 1 032 
With surface water 102 171 
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Figure 17  A Kenyan farmer Mt Kenya region Figure 18 Rice Irrigation Tana delta 
 (Wikipedia)  (©Rutten) 
 
 
In their Vision 2030 the Kenyan authorities elaborated on the need to secure food 
and jobs for a growing population by raising productivity and production in the 
agricultural sector. Over-reliance on rain-fed agriculture was considered as one 
of the major causes of food insecurity. Subsequently, irrigation returned on the 
desk of the planners at the National Irrigation Board for rehabilitating dormant 
schemes. It was also realized that new areas should be brought under irrigation to 
address the country’s food deficit. The aim was to promote micro schemes. A 
draft irrigation policy aimed to irrigate 1.2 million ha in the drylands of the coun-
try, which meant an (over)ambitious expansion of 32,000 ha per year (Ocra 
2013).  
However, recent attempts to revive some of the public schemes have already 
been seen to be most challenging. The Ocra consultants’ study for FAO on the 
wisdom of developing (semi-) arid irrigation in Kenya concluded that although 
food security would be increased:  
 
1.  Irrigation potential is limited due to scarcity and quality of water; 
2.  To a large extent irrigation in ASALs is still for subsistence purposes; 
3.  Most schemes are perennially dependent on outside assistance, hence sustainability is 
doubtful unless they are commercialised  
4.  Risk of salinization and  
5.  Likely more conflicts with (agro-)pastoralists.  
 
Dekelver (2003) reports of these conflicts for the pastoral Turkana in north west-
ern Kenya. Irrigation in this area has been developed from the 1940s onwards, 
but more seriously since the early 1960 drought. The Turkana authorities, how-
ever, concluded in the mid 1980s that especially the government-initiated irriga-
tion schemes were uneconomic and heavily subsidised. Costs exceeded the value 
of crops produced. Besides, the schemes experienced a lack of qualified staff, 
water and land to expand, and they were confronted with salinity of soils. These 
negative outcomes were also familiar experiences for large- scale schemes as 
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developed in the irrigated areas of Hola and Bura along the Tana river. Unless 
profitable crops could be grown these schemes would never be successful, even 
if all other problems (seed and water provision, labour and credit availability) 
would be taken care of (De Leeuw pers. com 2014). Both schemes profited from 
Dutch expertise, and so did the Lower Tana Village irrigation scheme. The mod-
el of small scale irrigation also ended in disarray, among other things because 
local people could make more money outside agriculture, the maintenance costs, 
which appeared to be too high, and the peculiarities of a delta with shifting river 
beds (Zoebl pers. com 2014) 
More recently developed plans to irrigate sugarcane in the heart of the Tana 
delta for ethanol production have been met with fierce opposition from pastoral-
ists and (international) wildlife organizations (Smalley 2011; Pickmeier & Rutten 
2013). The only operative large-scale government-run rice scheme is the Tana 
Delta Irrigation Project. Rice is also produced in Mwea (in Central Kenya; one of 
the classical irrigation schemes in Kenya), and more recently in western Kenya 
by a private developer, an American company (Dominion Farms), in the Yala 
swamp. Both schemes have recently been challenged because of problems with 
insufficient water provision and protests by the local community over water pol-
lution and lost access to a crucial wetland (Dominion), respectively. In spite of 
intensified production methods Mwea still only produces some 30 bags of rice 
per acre as compared to 200 bags in China (Mwangi 2014). Loans from the 
World Bank and Japan are meant to rehabilitate infrastructure, build a new dam, 
and expand the irrigation scheme and double production in the years ahead.   
The most ambitious irrigation project, however, has been the one million acres 
Galana-Kulalu scheme as part of the National Food Security Project launched in 
January 2014 by President Uhuru Kenyatta. It is located near the coast south of 
the Tana delta in a former government farm. Besides a 10,000 acres model farm 
the idea is to host a mix of large- scale commercial cultivation, small holders us-
ing ground water and greenhouses and livestock feedlot development. Israeli ex-
pertise and financing is involved. Doubts have been aired about the size of the 
scheme and its viability (Ngirachu, 02/07/2014).  
Kenya is part of the East African Agricultural Productivity Program 
(EAAPP) financed by the World Bank and partners. The overarching goal of the 
EAAPP is to increase agricultural productivity and growth in eastern Africa, by 
focusing on priority commodities such as cassava, rice, wheat and smallholder 
dairy production. The project is implemented by ASARECA, the Association for 
Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa and supports 
the objectives set by African countries through the Comprehensive Africa Agri-
culture Development Programme (CAADP). 
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Kenya is also part of the World Bank’s Water Security and Climate Resilience 
Project. The goals are to (i) increase availability and productivity of irrigation 
water for project beneficiaries; and (ii) enhance the institutional framework and 
strengthen capacity for water security and climate resilience for the country.  
Energy dynamics 
For many years the Kenyan energy sector has been plagued by the high cost of 
power and unreliability of supply (Rutten 2005:310). The extent to which the 
Vision 2030 objectives can be realised depends also on improvements of the en-
ergy supply. The realisation of these objectives is only feasible if quality energy 
services are availed in a sustainable, competitive, cost effective and affordable 
manner to all sectors of the economy, ranging from manufacturing, services, 
mining, and agriculture to households (National Energy Policy; final draft 2014). 
Development of the sector is largely dependent on foreign support, notably from 
the World Bank (transmission), Japan (hydropower) and Germany (geothermal). 
45% of Kenya’s electricity is derived from hydroelectric plants, 42 % from fossil 
fuels, 13% from other (renewable) sources (CIA World Factbook).  
New investments in the energy sector are a priority for Kenya. A key aim is to 
reduce the heavy dependency on hydropower which during times of drought is 
less reliable. Besides energy import from Ethiopia, energy derived from a to be 
constructed wind park near Lake Turkana (Netherlands involvement) and coal 
mining (China involvement) are seen to be the most important ways to overcome 
the deficit. Recent discoveries of gas and especially oil in Turkana County come 
with challenges to the sustainable use of water aquifers and water quality. In the 
production phase, typical volumes of water involved would be approximately 50 
gallons of water for every barrel of oil produced (Tullow Oil). 
The 2010 Constitution states that the National Government is responsible for 
protection of the environment and natural resources with a view to establishing a 
durable and sustainable system of development including water protection, secur-
ing sufficient residual water, hydraulic engineering and the safety of dams. Ken-
ya has an estimated hydropower potential of about 6,000MW comprising of large 
hydros (sites with capacity of more than 10MW) and small hydros. Of the large 
hydros, 807MW has been exploited and accounts for about 50% of installed gen-
eration capacity as at 2013, while about 1,450MW remains unexploited. Potential 
for small hydros is over 3,000MW, of which less than 25MW has been devel-
oped.  
The amount of electricity that can be generated depends on how far the water 
drops and how much water moves through the system. This is a major challenge. 
Especially industries complain about power cuts because of hydropower being 
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vulnerable as poor rains results in energy shortfalls. Also during rains water is 
lost due to inadequate storage capacity estimated to be some 100GW per year. 
Other challenges are of a financial, technical and management nature and the 
need to relocate affected people (National Energy Policy Draft 2014:45/46).  
By the end of 2013, more than 260 small hydropower sites had been identified 
and the largest number of sites are found in the Tana River drainage basin, main-
ly in the counties of Kirinyaga, Muranga, Meru and Tharaka Nithi, so areas with 
high population densities. Energy development projects have various impacts on 
communities. Key among these is both economic and physical displacement. 
Physical displacement of project-affected people is particularly prevalent in pro-
jects such as hydro power plants requiring water reservoirs, acquisition of way 
leaves during construction of transmission lines and pipelines. Others include the 
concern by local communities that they will not benefit from these projects (Na-
tional Energy Policy Draft 2014). The Kenyan government will establish a Con-
solidated Energy Fund that, among others, will cater for hydro risk mitigation 
during times of prolonged drought and conservation of water towers. 
Climate change and environmental issues 
Climate change models for Kenya show a picture that for most areas foresee 
higher temperatures and higher precipitation figures (Waithaka et al. 2013), with 
a mean rise of about 2ºC and 200mm per annum over the 2000 to 2050 period.  
Still, recurrent droughts, floods and the associated losses are concerns that 
have featured much in public debate in the recent past (Alila & Atieno 2006). By 
contrast, Mwangi & Rutten (2012) confirm for Kajiado county higher annual 
rainfall figures in the last decade but also stress that access to water is lost due to 
competition between users, especially large scale farmers mining ground water. 
In other areas, like near Mt Kenya, similar observations have been made, albeit 
that rains come less predictably than in earlier days. It has also been noticed that 
temperatures indeed seem to be on the rise.  
In Kenya, there is a particular concern over tea – a critically important sector 
for the economy, but which is also highly sensitive, like coffee, to climate 
change. Given its economic importance, tea in Kenya is facing challenges under 
climate change threats, raising concerns over the long run about its viability. Ac-
cording to a FAO report on Climate Change and Tea in Kenya, already tea pro-
ducers are facing reduced and erratic rainfalls, higher rate of hail or frost epi-
sodes as well as increasing temperatures that heavily affect yields and productivi-
ty levels. Over 500,000 smallholder tea producers are facing increased uncertain-
ty about future livelihoods. The FAO has been asked to provide technical support 
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and carry out a climate change impact assessment on tea and provide policy sup-
port in formulating a climate-compatible tea sector in Kenya. 
While tea (and coffee) might suffer from temperature rises, all climate models 
predict yield gains in areas that have not previously been able to cultivate maize. 
These are areas that were too dry for successful maize production. With new are-
as becoming available for maize cultivation, like most of the ASALs, there are 
challenges to managing these options prohibiting conflicts with the original land 
use practices like pastoralism.  
A major obstacle to come to clear statements about Kenya’s future climate sit-
uation is the lack of long term data series. Water Resource Management Authori-
ty (WRMA) inherited a deteriorated water resources network that had been re-
duced from about 1000 stations to less than 200. Besides the reduction in num-
bers, the data had many gaps where it was being monitored or there were no data 
at all.  
Besides climate challenges the main environmental issues in Kenya are water 
pollution from urban and industrial wastes; groundwater mining, degradation of 
water quality from increased use of pesticides and fertilizers; deforestation; soil 
erosion and desertification.    
Pressing needs  
* Measures to deal with population growth  
Population growth figures paint a picture of the likely pressure on productive 
resources if the country is challenged to remain food secure with increased num-
bers to feed (Waithaka et al. 2013). Population growth, although slowing down, 
will make Kenya in the next decade become even more water scarce.  
 
 
Table 6   Kenya (Medium variant) 2015-2025 
Year Population Population density Period Population growth
 (’000)  (pop/km2)  rate% 
2015 46,749 81 2005-2010 2.68 
2020 52,906 91 2010-2015 2.67 
2025 59,386 102 2015-2020 2.47 
   2020-2025 2.31 
Source: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm 
 
 
Table 7 Availability of water in Kenya 2008-2025 
Kenya 2008 2015 2025 
Total renewable water (109m3/yr) 30.7   
Total renewable per capita (m3/cap/yr) 792 657 517 
Source: http://www.unep.org/pdf/africa_water_atlas.pdf; author’s calculation 
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The growth of the Kenyan population of over a million citizens annually trans-
lates in a growing scarcity of (renewable) annual water availability per person to 
slightly over 517 m3 (Table 7). Kenya faces a serious challenge to provide suffi-
cient amounts of water for drinking as well as production of food and other 
needs. This will add pressure on an economy that needs high growth figures to 
provide jobs for a young population eager to enter the (formal) job market. Lack 
of data hampers the analysis of poverty trends but the World Bank estimates that 
national poverty has fallen to 39% in 2012/13. The continuing structural econom-
ic shift from agriculture to services and sustained economic growth in Nairobi 
and its expanding suburban areas have been particularly important drivers to 
lower poverty rates. However, inequality in Kenya is relatively high: Kenya’s 
2006 Gini coefficient of 47.7 was higher than that of neighbours Ethiopia, Tan-
zania, and Uganda. The strategy’s target of adding one million jobs per year, if 
achieved, would give a big boost to reducing inequality. Recent plans to provide 
opportunities for graduates to engage as volunteers exemplifies the need and dif-
ficulty to meet the target of creating one million jobs annually.  
 
* Sustainable economic growth and agricultural productivity 
The ambitions for the 2013-17 period are high and aim to move average annual 
real GDP growth rates up to 8.2%, even reaching double digit growth in 2017. 
This would require a significant acceleration from the recent growth levels, espe-
cially in agriculture which is projected to grow by 6.5 percent on average annual-
ly, compared to an average of 3.5 percent during 1997-2012. But the structure of 
the economy faces many challenges to be dealt with in the years ahead: low agri-
cultural productivity, a narrow export base, high energy costs and a declining 
manufacturing sector besides major economic and social disparities (IMF 2014). 
Higher productivity is key and to that end investment in physical infrastructure 
(including ICT and science) and human capital, as well as through reforms in the 
public sector, security, land, education, and drought risk management are needed. 
A major issue will be how to fund this growth keeping debt sustainable. IMF 
suggests seeking innovative funding mechanisms including public-private part-
nerships, besides domestic revenue mobilization and efficient public spending. 
For agriculture, in particular, IMF officials urge to promote private sector partic-
ipation in management of the irrigation schemes to be established foremost in the 
semi-arid regions (IMF 2014). The recent withdrawal of a large number of pri-
vate companies from the Tana delta shows, however, that within these dry zones 
delta’s and wetlands might not be the easiest places to engage in given opposition 
from nature conservation groups and local people. Still, care is needed to under-
stand motives for resistance or support as these are place and group specific. 
(Examples are available whereby nomadic pastoralists and farmers welcome in-
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vestors under certain conditions and for a wide range of reasons in certain loca-
tions, while nearby places, especially crucial dry season grazing areas, will be 
no-go zones for irrigated agriculture in the view of local livestock owners). 
Young agriculturalists, by contrast, are less negative as they hope to be able to 
acquire a wage employment opportunity instead of trying to make ends meet as a 
small scale farmer (Pickmeier & Rutten 2012). Meeting all these demands for 
(productive) water and jobs will be a balancing act.  
The rise in the use of irrigated agriculture, using both surface and groundwa-
ter, using greenhouses seems to provide an opportunity also to assist youth 
groups to create jobs for themselves. However, if groundwater abstractions 
through deep boreholes go beyond the point of sustainable use, there is a risk that 
nearby shallow aquifers will be drained beyond restoration. The recent trend to 
move into mining of groundwater (both rural and urban) should be conducted 
with great care and in a sustainable manner only.  
 
* Smart technology and institutional frameworks 
There is a need for smart and cheap technologies and institutional frameworks to 
create lasting business cases that can fulfil the demand for affordable and secure 
water. At the moment though, businesses are started in rural areas that harm the 
environment even further (charcoal production through felling of riverine trees, 
sand harvesting from the river bed for the construction industry, collecting rocks 
from rivers allowing too fast runoff during times of rain, mining and selling of 
groundwater and brokering of land to industries that pollute the environment). 
In urban settings, like Nairobi, the use of groundwater seems to have increased 
rapidly since the drought of 2009, especially in well-off neighbourhoods where 
individual households have drilled boreholes in their backyards. Smart rain water 
harvesting should be promoted in urban areas. Serving the less well-off could be 
an interesting option for innovative businesses. In Mombasa, a Dutch entrepre-
neur has put up a company that is using high-end technology machines to recycle 
and clean waste water into bottled water at the same time creating employment. 
Making Kenya more investment friendly would be one aspect that needs atten-
tion, but unfortunately latest reports indicate that it has become less easy to ac-
quire work permits for foreigners. 
The use of mobile phones to pay water bills, report leakages and inform cus-
tomers on availability and prices of potable water might also be a field for further 
scrutiny. Likewise, the rising shortage and costs of fertilizer might allow for pro-
jects that improve sanitation in the urban slums of the country, and make use of 
human waste as bio-fertilizers.  
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* Improvement of (urban) water governance  
Despite the far-reaching water reforms laid down in the Water Act 2002 and the 
National Water Resources Management Strategy 2006-2008 (Kenya 2006a), wa-
ter governance in Kenya still faces a myriad of challenges. In relation to urban 
water supply, Owuor & Foeken (2009) list the following: 
- It is not clear whether the water companies are private or public. Whereas under the Compa-
nies Act, water and sanitation companies are registered as private, limited liability compa-
nies, they are 100% publicly owned by the local authorities and are managing public assets 
to give an essential public service. 
- The water and sanitation companies have inherited old, dilapidated and in some cases obso-
lete infrastructure from the local authorities, the National Water Conservation and Pipeline 
Corporation and/or the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. So far, rehabilitation of the existing 
infrastructure is yet to be fully achieved. 
- All the water companies have inherited employees previously employed in the Department 
of Water and Sewerage of their respective local authorities or from the Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation. Only the directors and managers have so far been hired competitively. 
- Inadequate capacity to manage the increasing demand for water. The populations in Kenya’s 
urban centres have increased and will continue to do so. A major challenge to the water com-
panies will be to provide enough water, in quantity and quality, to the increasing population. 
- Limited resources and high costs of operation and maintenance. As much as the water com-
panies are supposed to run as commercial enterprises, they are incurring very high operation 
and maintenance costs, compared to the revenue they are collecting. 
- Local political interference and corruption. In its strategic plan (2007-2012), Kisumu Water 
and Sewerage Company points “local political interference” as one of the risks towards good 
governance, financial resource mobilization, promotion of efficient utilization of resources 
and effective communication to stakeholders and customers (KIWASCO 2008). 
- Inherited debts, liabilities and too many fees to be paid.  
- Extension of water services to the low-income neighbourhoods. Poor planning has made it 
difficult for municipalities to put up a water infrastructure, especially in the mushrooming in-
formal settlements. Their illegal status – at least according to the municipal authorities – has 
hindered the expansion of municipal services to serve them. 
- Lack of autonomy to do major investments. Since the companies do not own the assets, they 
are only allowed to do minor investments. Water Services Boards who own and manage the 
assets are the ones responsible for investment. 
- Flat rate tariffs will continue to persist as long as the problem of lack of meters and malfunc-
tioning meters is not addressed. 
- Despite the efforts towards controlling, reducing and stopping this unsustainable habit from 
the consumers, water companies are faced with the persistence of illegal connections, not on-
ly in low income areas as one would expect, but also in other parts of the city. 
 
* Proper water governance and transparency in the energy sector 
The energy sector has reached a crucial moment in time. Oil exploration might 
create benefits for the (local) economy and create jobs, but will also put more 
pressure on nearby water resources. This is equally true for biofuels. Transparen-
cy stands out as a crucial factor. For hydropower development the need for prop-
er water governance should be added to make sure downstream users are not af-
fected negatively. 
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